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91 
The Jangali Movement and How Its Themes 
Persist in Protests Under the Islamic Republic  
 




Thanks to the Jangali Movement in the early decades of the 20th 
century, the northern province of Gilan in Iran was able to successfully 
establish a system of government that served the working-class population 
of the region.  Although short-lived, this movement was a product of years 
of extreme exploitation of the labor, resources, and capital by both the 
national government and the global hegemonic powers of the era.  The 
movement brought together an incredibly diverse coalition of working-class 
individuals who wanted to create a more equitable society.  Under the current 
Islamic Republic of Iran, there have been several large-scale protests that 
have been triggered by similarly dire economic conditions.  Although these 
recent protests have yet to bring about significant lasting change, the 
proliferation of each subsequent protest shows that the country is ripe for a 
serious restructuring of society, akin to the Jangali Movement that occurred 
a century prior, to focus more on the struggling working class population in 
Iran. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The Jangali Movement was a pivotal movement in Iran’s history.  It 
created the blueprint for a working-class movement striving to create a more 
idealistic and equitable Iran.  Since the 1979 Revolution, there have been 
several attempts to mobilize against the current authoritative regime, namely 
the Green Movement and the recent Gas Price Protests.  Both movements 
independently achieved several conditions necessary for a successful 
uprising against the Islamic Republic.  In order to move towards an Iran that 
works for today’s working class, a movement would have to emulate many 
of the elements of the Jangali Movement, which the Green Movement and 
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II.  Part 1: The Jangali Movement 
 
A.  A Brief History 
 
The Persian Constitutional Revolution that took place from 1906 until 
1911 resulted in the ratification of Iran’s first constitution, one of the first in 
the Middle East.1  However, there was major discontent with the ratified 
constitution amongst the working class, because it left a monarchy in place 
who for years had “granted special privileges and consequent control of the 
Iranian economy to British and Russian companies and envoys, often at the 
expense of the local Iranian merchants and artisans.”2  Furthermore, the 
constitution failed to curb the continued influence of global hegemonic 
power in Iran.3  This led to the birth of the Jangali Movement in the northern 
Iranian province of Gilan in 1915,4 which ultimately culminated in the 
establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran from 1920 to 1921.5  
The Jangali Movement would come to “[epitomize] the tragic ideological 
drifting and factional conflicts of postconstitutional Iran.”6 
The Jangalis were primarily a group of working-class individuals 
comprised of “radical intellectuals, tribal leaders, merchants, as well as 
artisans, peasants, and small [landowners].”7 They were a ragtag group of 
idealists that “knew almost nothing about politics or military strategy” and 
“pledged not to cut their hair or shave their beards until all foreigners, 
Russian and British occupiers especially, left the country.”8  The Jangalis 
became one of the first “Third World guerrilla movements of the twentieth 
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Ugo Mattei for supervising this note, and the Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review and all its editors for all their tireless work putting together this publication.  And a 
very special thank you to Armin Jamali, Rahim Bidgoli, Ryan Arang Bidgoli, and Lilit 
Arakelyan for all their support. 
 1. Mina E.Khalil, Early Modern Constitutionalism in Egypt and Iran, 15 J. ISLAMIC & 
NEAR E. L. 33, 33 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 45. 
 3. ABBAS AMANAT, IRAN: A MODERN HISTORY 407 (2017). 
 4. See ABDY JAVADZADEH, IRANIAN IRONY, 92 n.239 (2011). “Jangali” translates to 
“people of the jungle,” which is a reference to the guerrilla warfare tactics that were utilized 
in the lush and dense forests of region.  Id.  The movement is also commonly referred to as 
the “Jangal Movement.”  Id.  This paper will use the term, “Jangali Movement,” to focus on 
the individuals of the movement instead of the movement’s geography. 
 5. Pezhmann Dailami, The Bolsheviks and the Jangali Revolutionary Movement, 1915-
1920, 31 Cahiers Du Monde russe et soviétique 43, 44 (1990). 
 6. AMANAT, supra note 3, at 407. 
 7. Janet Afary, The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan Republic in Iran: A 
Critical Exploration, 28 IRANIAN STUD. 3, 5 (1995). 
 8. Id. 
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century fighting for national liberation.”9  Their main goals were to achieve 
national independence from the Russian and British Empires and to end the 
government corruption in Tehran that had plagued the country for many 
years.10  
As the Russians began their retreat from the region in the lead up to the 
1917 Russian Revolution, the Jangalis were able to establish political and 
military control of Gilan.11 The Jangalis organized administrative agencies, 
built roads, set up medical clinics, and taxed imports that entered through 
Gilan’s ports on the Caspian Sea.12  The Jangalis “saw themselves as the 
continuers of the unfinished Constitutional Revolution” from years earlier as 
they addressed the numerous long neglected needs of the working class in 
Gilan.13 
In May of 1920, Mirza Kuchik Khan, the de facto leader of the Jangali 
Movement, formally established the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran.14  A 
few months later in July, control of Gilan shifted from Mirza Kuchik Khan 
and his socialist supporters to a pro-communist faction of the Jangali 
Movement.15  This new government enforced a “stringent tax on the 
wealthy” and “proposed radical social changes such as greater rights for 
women.”16  They even circulated rumors that “wealthy landowners who did 
not surrender their property would be buried alive.”17  The Jangalis 
ultimately lost control of Rasht, the capital and largest city in Gilan, in 
September 1921 when Reza Khan Pahlavi sent in forces to dismantle the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran.18 
 
B.  The Legacy of the Jangali Movement 
 
The Jangali Movement was never intended to become a separatist 
movement from Iran because the Jangalis were extremely nationalistic.19  To 
this day, Iranians, particularly those from Gilan, fondly remember Mirza 
Kuchik Khan as a heroic revolutionary and socialist who looked out for the 
working class in order to create a better Iran.  He came to “characterize all 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.at 7. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 8. 
 19. GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN IRAN, 1918-1948: A STUDY IN BIG-
POWER RIVALRY 54 (1949). 
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the hopes and despair of nonelite Iranians” of the era.20  Even the current 
government of Iran, the Islamic Republic, has propagated Mirza Kuchik 
Khan’s story to show how he was “a forerunner of the Islamic Republic,” 
because he was an avowed nationalist and a devout practitioner of Islam.21 
Instead, the Jangali Movement was the culmination of a series of 
protests and movements which had been occurring across the country, but 
were particularly concentrated in Gilan leading up to the Constitutional 
Revolution.22  When the Constitutional Revolution fell short of meeting the 
needs of everyday Iranians, the wheels of the Jangali Movement were set 
into motion.  The constitution had failed to expel the influence of foreign 
nations in Iranian politics and put an end to their exploitation of Iranian 
people and resources.  Additionally, the constitution left the monarchy in 
place, preventing Iran from becoming a true democracy and facilitating the 
“return to power of the old elites joined by wealthy provincial landowners.”23  
The ultimate irony in the saga of the Jangali Movement and the short-lived 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran is that they were ultimately crushed by a 
monarch who rose to power “through a British-Sponsored coup”—a 
combination of the things their movement was against.24 
 
C.  The State of the Iranian Economy in the 19th Century 
 
Throughout the 19th century, the British and Russian exploitation of 
Iranians and their land destroyed the Iranian economy, ravaging the province 
of Gilan in particular.  British and Russian banks began opening financial 
institutions across Iran in order to expedite and facilitate trade due to the 
increasing demand for products from Iran.25  Gilan and the Caspian region 
in northern Iran likely saw the most commercialization in the country thanks 
to its uniquely wet climate and fertile land.26 
Gilan’s economy has traditionally been based primarily on agriculture 
resulting in a large working-class population.  However, the level of foreign 
demand for its agricultural goods led to the over-extraction of fields and was 
destroying the livelihoods of the people of Gilan.  As a result, the working 
class “saw their standard of living inexorably decline” as they were pressured 
 
 20. AMANAT, supra note 3, at 407. 
 21. Afary, supra note 7, at 4. 
 22. Janet Afary, Peasant Rebellions of the Caspian Region During the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1909, 23 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 137, 137-8 (1991). 
 23. AMANAT, supra note 3, at 408. 
 24. Afary, supra note 7, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 25. Afary, supra note 22, at 140. 
 26. Id. at 148. 
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to produce more “export crops” to send abroad, instead of the “food staples” 
they needed to survive.27 
Additionally, monopolies on crops, such as olives, were granted to 
corporations that were based in other countries by the central government in 
Tehran, which was working in conjunction with the Russians and the 
British.28  Consequently, not only were the global hegemonic powers 
controlling what people in Iran were producing, they were limiting who 
would be able to profit off that production.  The peasants and working class 
were essentially locked into their place in society and any surplus they 
created was promptly extracted by external forces.   
Furthermore, the proliferation of trade with Europe hurt the artisans of 
Iran because their “handicrafts were no match for the less expensive, mass-
produced merchandise from abroad.”29  Iranian merchants “watched while 
their control of the export trade and some internal markets fell into Western 
hands.”30  These smaller traders and artisans simply “suffered the collapse of 
their livelihood.”31  The effects were further compounded by the increasing 
costs of food and rapidly rising levels of unemployment.32  The failure of the 
Iranian government to protect its people, instead choosing to get in bed with 
the imperialistic powerhouses of the time, led to the destruction of the 
livelihoods of the working class and the peasants across the country, but 
particularly in Gilan. 
As a result, the Jangalis desperately wanted autonomy from the 
increasing influence of the global hegemonic powers within Iran.  By the end 
of the 19th century, growing economic ties with the West resulted in the 
“destitution” of the working class.33  Fortunately, Gilan had a prominent 
history of trade union activity and a “tradition of alliance among the 
craftsmen, the urban poor, and the poor peasants.”34  This network of 







 27. John Foran, The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran’s Populist Alliance: A Class 
Analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, 20 THEORY & SOC’Y 795, 800 (1991). 
 28. Afary, supra note 22, at 148. 
 29. Id. at 140. 
 30. Foran, supra note 27, at 800. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Afary, supra note 22, at 139-40. 
 34. Id. at 137. 
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D.  Land Disputes in 19th Century Iran 
 
Furthermore, although the Constitutional Convention “marked the end 
of the Qajar absolute monarchy,” the Jangalis were disappointed that the 
monarchy remained and retained a significant amount of power in the new 
government, ultimately at the cost of working-class people’s interest.35  
There were many reasons for the discontent regarding the monarchy and its 
neglect of working-class Iranians.  However, one of the primary sources of 
frustration, particularly in Gilan, was the seizure of land by the government 
and its subsequent sale to private landowners.36  
Traditionally, land was organized into “village settlements” in Iran 
where “community members often held equal property rights.”37  This 
arrangement had provided “a relatively high standard of living” for peasants 
in the Iran during the 19th century.38  Peasants typically had “a comfortable 
residence, sufficient clothing, and a good supply of food, including fruit and 
sometimes meat.”39  However, this “increase in landlord holdings” and 
privatization of the commons directly resulted in a “worsening of the living 
standards of the peasants.”40  
Furthermore, not only had the peasants and the working class lost 
control of the lands that they lived on, worked on, and profited from, but they 
also lost their informal system of settling disputes within their respective 
communities.  Traditionally, an elder within the village mediated conflicts 
and settled disputes that arose within the commons, but that role was swiftly 
replaced by the landlords who had only monetary interests at stake in any 
disputes.41  While in the past “a peasant’s right to his land was guarded 
stringently by the village community,” now the landlords were making 
decisions with only their profits in mind.42 
Even before the nascence of the Jangali Movement, this new 
arrangement was deeply unpopular with the working class.  In addition to all 
the aforementioned economic struggles, landlords had increased taxes on the 
working class and increasingly passed the costs of production onto 
workers.43  British and Russian troops used tens of thousands of soldiers to 
 
 35. HAMID DABASHI, IRAN WITHOUT BORDERS: TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF THE 
POSTCOLONIAL NATION 31 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 36. COSROE CHAQUERI, THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1920-1921: BIRTH OF 
THE TRAUMA 15-16 (1995). 
 37. Afary, supra note 22, at 139 (emphasis added).  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Foran, supra note 27, at 800. 
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protect landlords in order to maintain stability in the country to ensure the 
continued production of the valuable export crops.44 
By the mid-to-late 19th century, peasants in Rasht eventually had 
organized several strikes and demanded that the landlords be expelled.45  
They began “[refusing] to continue paying their landlords’ rents.”46  Even 
with British and Russian troops on their side, the landlords felt that they had 
to create their own council “to break the peasants’ resistance.”47 
These tensions between landowners and peasants persisted until the 
Jangali Movement blossomed in 1915.  The landlords of Gilan “resented the 
extensive support the [Jangali] fighters received from the Gilani peasants.”48  
Meanwhile, with the bad blood between the peasants and the landlords still 
fresh, Mirza Kuchik Khan and the armed Jangalis financed their movement 
in large part “by extorting ransom from Gilan landowners.”49 
 
E.  Takeaways from the Jangali Movement 
 
The Jangali Movement was a product of the events that were occurring 
within Iran that were simultaneously being shaped by forces from outside 
the county.  The continued meddling in Iranian affairs by the British and 
Russians stunted Iran’s ability to develop as a country during a pivotal 
moment in its history.  Its economy was ravaged and its people were 
exploited.  Decisions were made by the Iranian government, at the expense 
of the working class, and the beneficiaries were thousands of miles away.  
The “process of class formation” in 19th-century Iran by the British and the 
Russians was solely driven by capitalistic intentions.  This was no accident: 
“tribalism was the modus operandi of a globalized capitalistic modernity that 
had invented and designated ‘Europe’ as its epicenter.”50  Consequently, a 
direct byproduct of the hegemonic powers creating such clear discrepancies 
between “the disenfranchised and the beneficiaries” resulted in the “the 






 44. Id. at 813-14. 
 45. Afary, supra note 22, at 150. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 152. 
 48. Afary, supra note 7, at 12. 
 49. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 19, at 55. 
 50. DABASHI, supra note 35, at 79. 
 51. Id. 
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III.  Part 2: Major Protests Under the Islamic Republic 
 
A.  A Brief History  
 
Since the 1979 Revolution, there have been periodic uprisings 
throughout the country against the authoritarian regime, due to its brutal 
policies and disregard for the Iranian people.  However, there have been three 
major, nationwide protests that have all occurred within the past decade: the 
Iranian Green Movement (“Green Movement”) that started in 2009, the 
protests in 2017-2018, and the “Gas Price Protests”52 in 2019.  The Green 
Movement was the first protest of its scale since the inception of the Islamic 
Republic, and it was born out of a legitimate challenge to the democratic 
process.  Meanwhile, the Gas Price Protests resulted in an unprecedented 
crackdown from the regime because of the burgeoning movement powered 
by the working class. 
The protests in 2017-2018 were significant in their own right and 
resulted in over 20 people being slaughtered by the regime.  Furthermore, 
these protests garnered widespread support from the working class 
demanding better working conditions for ethnic minorities, protection 
against discrimination for women, and the end of the compulsory hijab.  
Unfortunately, these demonstrations were never able to materialize past 
large-scale protests into a sustained movement, like the Green Movement 
and the Gas Price Protests.  These latter two movements bear the greatest 
resemblance to the Jangali Movement. 
 
B.  The Iranian Green Movement 
 
The Green Movement53 was born out of a series of protests and 
demonstrations that broke out after there was “obvious vote rigging” in the 
2009 Iranian Presidential Election.54  As the results of the election started 
coming in, a couple provinces recorded “a turnout of more than 100%,” 
while four others reported a turnout of over 90%.55  Even if these falsified 
numbers were set aside, the official results put out by the government were 
 
 52. Because of the relative recency (and potential continuation) of the protests, it has not 
been dubbed with a specific identifying name yet.  For the purposes of brevity and 
consistency, this paper will identify the movement at the “Gas Price Protests.” It is likely that 
the movement will be identified otherwise in the near future. 
 53. AMANAT, supra note 3, at 895 (adopting the protesters’ color as the name of the 
movement). 
 54. AMANAT, supra note 6, at 877. 
 55. DANIEL BERMAN & THOMAS RINTOUL, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING 
FIGURES IN IRAN’S 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (Ali Ansari ed., 2009). 
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still essentially a statistical impossibility.  Furthermore, the election was 
called within two hours in favor of the incumbent, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad—preferred candidate of the Supreme Leader—despite the fact 
that the entire country uses paper ballots that are required to be counted by 
hand.56  Consequently, protests broke out across the country within hours 
and continued to grow in size.57  These protests continued throughout the rest 
of the year and into 2010, growing into a sustained movement.58  Support for 
the movement was also subsequently rekindled in 2011 and 2012 during the 
Arab Spring.59 
These protests were notable for the participation of large numbers of 
“women, young people, intellectuals” and even “members of the moderate 
clerical establishment.”60  This was not the first time that women were highly 
involved in an Iranian movement,61 but it has become less common since the 
Islamic Republic was established due to the restrictions it has put in place.  
Additionally, the involvement of the clerical establishment in the protests 
was simply unprecedented.  It signaled the first break in the unified front that 
the religious elite have presented, since the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic.  Although this widespread involvement by numerous different 
groups resulted in the largest demonstrations since the 1979 Revolution, the 
movement was primarily classified by and remembered for the particularly 
strong turnout and active involvement of the “urban middle class.”62 
Although the Iranian economy has been particularly under pressure 
from international sanctions and from neglect by the central government in 
the past decades, the working class has primarily had to shoulder that 
financial burden.  However, the government’s shameless disregard of 
democracy was an attack on the aspirational ideals of the educated middle 
class.  There is no dispute that Iran’s democracy is extremely flawed.  This 
is most notably due to both the simple lack of transparency in Iranian politics 
and the very structure of Iranian elections where the Guardian Council, a 
constitutionally created body of religious elite, reserve supreme veto power 
over any candidate who is elected to public office.  Nevertheless, such a 
blatant and globally undisputed rigging of an election was an affront to the 
 
 56. Robert F. Worth & Nazila Fathi, Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middle 
east/14iran.html. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Akbar Ganji, Iran’s Green Movement Five Years Later — ‘Defeated’ But Ultimately 
Victorious, HUFFPOST (Aug. 9, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iran-green-move 
ment-five-years_b_5470078. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Worth & Fathi, supra note 56. 
 61. Foran, supra note 27, at 804. 
 62. AMANAT, supra note 3, at 894. 
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educated middle class and resulted in several years of unrest throughout the 
country. 
Ultimately, the government’s response to all these protests was swift 
and unprecedented in Iran.  There were “subsequent clampdown[s] on the 
rallies, mass arrests of protesters, barbaric torture in detention centers, and 
secret murders of detainees.”63  Furthermore, the government held “mass 
trials in front of television cameras.”64  The government in Tehran wanted to 
assure that they would not be challenged by such a unified group of Iranians 
again by instilling fear in society. 
In the end, although unsuccessful in their goal, “the Green Movement 
. . . above all demonstrated popular demand for liberalization, democracy, 
and accountability.”65  It came to symbolize the first time, since the 1979 
Revolution, that the Iranian people came together and spoke out against the 
government on such a unified front.  The Green Movement was recognized 
worldwide and the global community was sympathetic with the Iranians’ 
calls for, above all else, free, fair, and transparent elections.  The Green 
Movement paved the way for future demonstrations and, at the very least, 
demonstrated the feasibility of organizing at such a large scale under the 
Islamic Republic.  It is no coincidence that since 2009, the number and size 
of nationwide protests has increased, despite the current regime’s 
willingness to crackdown and use increasingly violent measures against 
Iranians to ensure that the regime’s power and authority remains 
unchallenged. 
 
C.  The Gas Price Protests of 2019 
 
When the clock struck midnight on Friday, November 15, 2019, the 
Iranian government “abruptly” doubled fuel prices across the country and 
“imposed a strict rationing system” without any prior warning to the Iranian 
people.66  As a result, “within hours,” Iranians across the country had flooded 
the streets in protest.67  By the end of the weekend, “outraged demonstrators 
in cities large and small were calling for an end to the Islamic Republic’s 
government and the downfall of its leaders.”68 
 
 63. Id. at 895. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Farnaz Fassihi & Rick Gladstone, Iran Abruptly Raises Fuel Prices, and Protests 
Erupt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/world/middle 
east/iran-gasoline-prices-rations.html. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Farnaz Fassihi & Rick Gladstone, With Brutal Crackdown, Iran Is Convulsed by 
Worst Unrest in 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/ 
world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html. 
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The price hikes on gasoline alone would have been extremely onerous 
on the working class in Iran.  However, when combined with the sanctions 
that United States President Donald Trump had reinstated on Iran a couple 
years earlier, it dealt a devastating blow to the working class of the country.  
The sanctions were designed to bring Iranian leaders to the table to negotiate 
a new nuclear deal following the United States’ withdrawal from the 
previous one.  However, all the costs resulting from the sanctions have 
primarily impacted low- and middle-income Iranians, because the regime 
simply passes off any costs onto the people, while the governing elite 
continue to live extravagant lifestyles.  In recent years, this has put an 
unsurmountable strain on the lives of everyday Iranians.   
Consequently, “most of the nationwide unrest seemed concentrated in 
neighborhoods and cities populated by low-income and working-class 
families.”69  These were the people who were already suffering most from 
Iran’s struggling economy and now had to deal with the additional burden of 
higher gas prices.  Gas is normally relatively cheap in Iran, thanks to 
government subsidization, so almost everyone relies heavily on their cars.70  
The subsidies are particularly crucial to students and the working class, 
because it allowed them to use their cars to make money by serving as a 
messenger or driver, essentially creating a “micro-economy” around the 
cheap gas.71  By doubling the price of fuel, the Islamic Republic essentially 
targeted the one lifeline many Iranians had to keep their lives afloat. 
Furthermore, a great number of these protests occurred within working-
class cities and towns, many of which have historically religious and 
conservative populations, “suggesting [that] this was an uprising born in the 
historically loyal power base of Iran’s post-revolutionary hierarchy.”72  
There are some clear parallels to when a handful of religious elite 
participated in the Green Movement and broke the typically unified front that 
the religious elite present in Iran.  However, this movement was distinct 
because it was a product of the discontent that the religious working class 
were feeling, not the religious elite.  If the Islamic Republic is to be removed, 
through a domestic movement without any intervention from Western 
democracies, a critical mass of conservative religious Iranians must 
withdraw their ardent support for the current regime.  This coalition is much 
more likely to be formed with the working-class religious Iranians, as 
opposed to the religious elite who likely are much more content with their 
place in Iranian society. 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. The Daily, A Deadly Crackdown in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/12/03/podcasts/the-daily/iran-protests.html. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Fassihi & Gladstone, supra note 68. 
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The fact that these crucial populations, that would be necessary for a 
future revolution, mobilized and turned out for the Gas Price Protests 
definitely presented a red flag for the regime and they made sure to respond 
accordingly.  Although the current regime has not shied away from using 
violence against Iranians in the past, the government’s “use of lethal force 
against people throughout the country [in response to the protests was] 
unprecedented, even for the Islamic Republic and its record of violence.”73  
There are still no exact numbers regarding total fatalities, and there likely 
will not be one in the future if the Iranian government has its way.  
Nevertheless, the roughly two weeks of protests quickly became the 
“deadliest political unrest since the Islamic Revolution 40 years ago.”74 
As soon as protests started breaking out, the regime promptly called on 
military and police forces to respond and they “[opened] fire on unarmed 
protesters” and “shot without warning.”75  They even targeted some of the 
“poorest suburbs” with tanks.76  The Iranian government claimed that 
“enemy cells” were firing at Iranian militias however this version of the story 
is highly disputed and likely false.77  Although the regime finally 
acknowledged killing civilians, they referred to them as “armed terrorists” 
and claimed that they were “hiding in the marshes and shooting at security 
forces.”78  The regime made sure to send a clear message that uprisings in 
the future will be responded to with a similar amount of force.   
The estimated fatalities according to “international rights organizations, 
opposition groups and local journalists” ranges from 180 to 450 people dead, 
within the four days following the increase in the price of gasoline.79  The 
State Department of the United States of America reported that the total 
number is “around 1,000.”80  However, the most recent estimate, based on 
numbers provided by three Iranian interior ministry officials to Reuters, has 
the total number dead at 1,500—“significantly higher than figures from 
international human rights groups and the United States.”81 By contrast, the 
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most liberal estimates of people killed by the current regime in any previous 
protest or uprising had not passed 100 people. 
Furthermore, at least 2,000 have been wounded and over 7,000 have 
been detained.82  The regime continues to dispute the accuracy of these 
numbers.83  However, it will likely be impossible to ever obtain an accurate 
count, because the Islamic Republic is highly unlikely to disclose the precise 
number of individuals killed.  Additionally, numerous bodies of murdered 
Iranian have been taken by the government and remain missing.84  The 
handful of families who were given bodies of their loved ones back had to 
agree not to speak to media or hold any funerals.85  The regime is doing 
everything it can to make sure that the global community does not find out 
the true extent of the atrocities that they committed.  There is already a report 
of one family being arrested for calling for “a nationwide day of mourning” 
after their family member was killed.86 
There have been hundreds of protests of various sizes throughout the 
country in the subsequent weeks following the initial wave of protests,87 
resulting in hundreds of more murders by the government.88  Future 
demonstrations will be a sign of progress for protesters, however they will 
also mean that the total number of fatalities will continue to grow as the 
government’s crackdowns continue to intensify and the brutality of the 
tactics they use becomes worse. 
Another element that made this series of protests distinct from previous 
uprisings in Iran, other than the number of people involved and the severity 
of the subsequent crackdown, was the government’s step to essentially 
disconnect the entire country from the internet.89  The “blanket of silence 
that fell over the country with the internet shutdown” was particularly 
notable because of the large population of Iranian émigrés across the world.90  
Iranians increasingly rely on messaging applications and social media to 
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keep in touch with their relatives all around the world who they otherwise 
would have no way to communicate with.  Nevertheless, the Iranian 
government decided to “completely [deny] access” to the internet for 
civilians while using “their own intranet . . . to keep vital infrastructures 
running like hospitals and banks.”91  As a result, Iranians were blocked out 
from the rest of the world.  Not only were people unable to communicate 
with each other, but the regime was able to have free reign to violently 
silence protesters without fear of video and images being distributed over the 
internet and across the world.  Eventually, the internet was restored and 
information and images of the violence began to leak out, but ultimately, the 
internet blackout effectively served its function.  As of the publication of this 
paper, the Islamic Republic has yet to face any serious international 
punishment or repercussion as a result of these barbaric measures. 
Partial and complete internet shutoffs are becoming more commonplace 
under authoritarian governments as the severity of censors on specific 
websites and applications increases and the throttling of national internet 
speeds occurs more frequently.92  In 2019, people in numerous countries 
including Venezuela, Sudan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Zimbabwe, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Benin, Malawi, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Egypt, Chad, Algeria, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Turkey all 
experience some degree of an internet shutoff in response to political 
unrest.93  Governments take these actions under the guise of “public safety,” 
which is “always a convenient excuse” because many countries have written 
into law that the government has the power to “cut off communication” in 
“situations of public emergency or public safety concerns.”94 
Iran had instituted a partial internet shutoff during the 2017-2018 
protests, primarily targeting all social media outlets, but it was not as severe 
as the internet shutoff caused by the Gas Price Protests.  NetBlocks, an 
organization that tracks internet access across the globe, described this as the 
“most severe disconnection” that they had ever tracked “in terms of its 
technical complexity and breadth.”95  The Iranian government will likely not 
hesitate to digitally silence its 80 million people again because of how 
efficiently it stifles any potential social movement.  Not only does disabling 
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the internet prevent the rest of the world from seeing the atrocities being 
committed by the current regime during times of civil unrest and revolt, but 
it also prevents Iranians from organizing and coordinating demonstrations. 
Iran has increasingly displayed an affinity towards taking more control 
of its people’s use and access to the internet than it has in the past.  Under 
normal circumstances Iranians, unlike people under some other authoritarian 
regimes, are actually able to access many websites and social media outlets, 
although with a significant amount of lag at times.  However, Iran, amongst 
other countries, has shown interest in “creating different levels of access to 
the internet.”96  Access would likely be partitioned by “social class” or 
“occupational needs.”97  This will certainly be considered more seriously by 
the government after these recent protests, both as a retaliatory measure in 
response to these protests but also as a preventative measure to decrease the 
likelihood of organized uprisings in the future.  Under this model, the regime 
can prevent the working class’ access to adequate internet to prevent future 
organization of mass movements, similar to the ones that were fueled by the 
working class during the Gas Price Protests.  At the same time, they would 
be able to provide adequate internet to Iranians in the middle and upper 
classes to keep them satiated and content.  Ultimately, the working class is 
going to have the cards stacked against them more so than ever before when 
the next nationwide movement against the Islamic Republic occurs. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
The Green Movement and the Gas Price Protests (as events currently 
stand) fell short of reaching their desired goals.  However, moving forward, 
both will serve as extremely valuable lessons for future movements in Iran. 
For example, “superficially, the Green Movement was just questioning 
the accuracy of the electoral vote-count,” however “at a deeper and more 
troubling level for the regime, it was giving air and momentum to something 
more deeply repressed.”98  It was the first time a movement on that scale had 
broken out since 1979, which showed that “the defiant spirit of Iran’s 
cosmopolitan culture . . . [had] resurfaced in triumph.”99  Consequently, even 
though the Islamic Republic has been in power for several decades, it had 
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“failed to manufacture a Homo Islamicus.”100  This is particularly notable 
because even in places like modern-day Russia, decades after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Homo Sovieticus101 is “alive and well.”102  The presence of the 
desire to push back against the regime despite decades of their oppressive 
rule was an encouraging development in the wake of the Green Movement. 
Furthermore, the murder of Neda, a young female protester during the 
Green Movement, became one of “the most widely witnessed deaths in 
human history.”103  The deliberate and merciless murder of a peaceful 
protester has come to symbolize the ruthlessness of the current regime.  The 
“massive social uprising” that followed after the video went viral “shook the 
Islamic regime to its foundations.”104  The entire global community was put 
on notice that the Islamic Republic has no regard for the lives of its own 
people. 
The recent Gas Price Protests are more reminiscent of the Jangali 
Movement thanks to the widespread organization of the working class.  
Unfortunately, these protests never found a leader, like the Jangalis, so 
protests were not organized and coordinated.  The Green Movement had a 
de facto leader in Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the candidate who had lost in the 
election.  Even though he was promptly placed under house arrest by the 
government, his guidance and leadership allowed the people to better 
organize and to continue protests over the course of several years.  It remains 
to be seen whether the Gas Price Protest will grow into a full-scale movement 
or will simply be remembered for being a short period of bloody unrest.  
Although the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani by the United States 
seemed to disrupt the momentum from the protests by bringing portions of 
the Iranian population together to mourn, the regime’s awful handling of the 
COVID-19 pandemic has frustrated Iranians once again. 
Nevertheless, the ability of the Gas Price Protests to unite the working 
class in Iran will be tremendously helpful for movements going forward.  
Although the organization of the middle class during the Green Movement 
was essential for laying the groundwork for future movements, organizing 
the large number of working-class individuals in Iran will be invaluable in 
any future protests.  The Gas Price Protests featured many “unemployed and 
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student youths, including many women” whose energy and voices will be 
crucial going forward.105 
Furthermore, there were significant changes in the country between the 
Green Movement and the Gas Price Protests, particularly with respect to the 
state of the economy in Iran and the willingness of the regime to violently 
and ruthlessly fightback against protesters.  The sanctions that have been 
placed on Iran over the past decade have destroyed its economy, which had 
already been weakened by the “billions of dollars” the government has spent 
on its “nuclear and missile programs” and its “political intervention[s] in 
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.”106  Even though food, medicine, and other 
essentials are not included in the sanctions, “Iran’s [entire] banking system 
is included,” meaning that these necessities effectively cannot be purchased.   
As a result, while the middle class were “demanding reforms within the 
existing system” in 2009, the 2017-2018 protests and the Gas Price Protests 
“have been revolts of the working class, especially unemployed youths,” and 
women thanks to the rapidly increasing levels of socioeconomic inequality 
in the country.107  The working class want a new system now, more than ever.  
Furthermore, this “deepening and diversification of protests since 2009” has 
led to the unrest penetrating the most rural communities, not just populated 
urban centers.108  Most notably, the working class, who have been in the 
frontlines of the 2017-2018 protests and the Gas Price Protests, “have gone 
beyond the demand for reform and want the overthrow of the regime.”109 
Ultimately, the Iranian people, particularly the working class have the 
burden of mobilizing citizens against the central government.  The country 
has become an “inefficient, militarized, theocratic state-capitalist regime in 
which over 80 percent of the capital is owned and managed by the IRGC110 
or its contractors.”111  Similar to the Jangalis who strived for a more idealistic 
Iran with a transparent and accountable central government that had the 
interests of the working class in mind, the modern working class in Iran have 
the same desire. 
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What remains to be seen is whether the regime continues to violently 
break up protests and movements by killing hundreds, if not thousands, of 
people.  Frankly, the regime, devoid of any sympathy or compassion, does 
not have any motivation to do otherwise.  Consequently, if the next major 
movement against the Islamic Republic wants to be successful, it will either 
need extremely widespread popular support to overwhelm the regime’s 
inevitable violent response, or some sort of intervention from abroad. 
Additionally, the question of how the regime will wield control of the 
internet looms large.  There are already reports that the regime has been 
blocking interest access ahead of scheduled subsequent protests.112  Internet 
access is essential to coordinate, organize, and broadcast what the regime is 
doing inside Iran.  Without internet access, any future movement will 
struggle to be successful because it will be difficult to quickly mobilize 
people to streets.  Alternatively, it is ineffective to organize protests too far 
in advance when the internet access is adequate because the regime would 
have significant time to plan a response.  
Nevertheless, a more idealistic, democratic, and equitable Iran will 
continue to be sought after by Iranians, particularly the working class, 
despite the dire conditions they face.  As of the publication of this paper, it 
remains to be seen whether the Gas Price Protests will develop into a full 
sustained movement like the Green Movement.  Signs seemed to point in the 
direction that it might become a full movement thanks to the popular national 
support it has gathered and the continuation of demonstrations over a month 
after the initial gas price hike.  However, it is unclear how the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic will shape Iran’s future and effect the momentum of 
these protests.  The regime botched the response to the pandemic, killing tens 
of thousands of Iranians, so the regime will likely be faced with a rekindling 
of protests and demonstrations akin to the level of outrange there was during 
the Gas Price Protests. 
One thing that is crystal clear is that the people have shown that they 
want change.  It is undisputed that the Islamic Republic has continued to put 
the needs and desires of the religious ruling elite ahead of the needs and 
desires of everyday Iranians.  Once again, Iran is at a point in its history 
where the Iranian government is making decisions without the Iranian people 
in mind.  Thousands of lives have already been lost in the effort to push back 
against the current regime in favor of a more idealistic and democratic Iran 
that has an accountable and transparent government.  The struggle will 
continue, but the people have definitely showed their will to fight. 
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